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Abstract. Since 2002 the German government has promoted private retirement saving plans 
by means of special subsidies and tax incentives (Riester scheme). This policy mainly targets 
low-income households. Using data from the German Socio-economic Panel, we scrutinize 
the  impact  of  the  Riester  scheme  on  private  savings.  Our  empirical  strategy  consists  of 
treating the introduction of the Riester scheme as a natural experiment. The estimation results 
cast some doubts on the effectiveness of the Riester scheme in raising private savings and call 
for enhanced systematic efforts to evaluate that policy. 
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1 Introduction  
In several OECD countries the government promotes private pension schemes by means of 
tax exemptions and subsidies (see Antolín et al., 2004, and Yoo and de Serres, 2004, for 
overviews). In Germany this has occurred since 2002 in form of so-called Riester contracts. 
The  justification  for  introducing  those  subsidized  retirement  plans  grounds  on  expected 
demographic  changes  leading  to  a  dramatic  increase  of  the  ratio  of  retirees  to  workers. 
Fostering private pensions was seen by the German government as a key step in order to 
provide  the  current  working  generation  with  enough  disposable  income  at  time  of  their 
retirement without increasing the social security contributions of the next working generation. 
Simple as it is, the economic rationale for such a policy has been questioned from various 
perspectives. First, subsidizing retirement plans cannot be Pareto improving since some of the 
taxes required to finance it are paid by households who do not benefit from those subsidies.
1 
Second, like any subsidy, the one associated with Riester contracts distorts relative prices and 
thus creates a deadweight loss. Third, the government protects the consumers by deciding 
which retirement plans merit subsidization. Hence, market entry is restricted. This makes it 
easier for insurance company to collude, with detrimental effects for allocative efficiency. 
Fourth,  the  Riester  scheme  is  likely  to  cause  significant  additional  costs,  e.g.  for 
conceptualizing, certifying and advertising Riester products, for controlling whether people 
are eligible for the subsidy or not, for comparing the relative merits of offered contracts, and 
for settling disputes between insurers and clients.
2 
The crucial issue about tax-favored retirement plans is, however, whether they actually boost 
savings and, if yes, by how much. If aggregate savings are unaffected, such a policy will be 
virtually neutral with respect to the wealth accumulated by the current working generation at 
retirement age. In that case, tax-favored retirement plans would have no impact on future 
national income: the size of the pie which retirees and workers will share would be the same 
as  without  that  policy.  Conversely,  if  that  policy  increases  aggregate  savings,  the  current 
working generation will have more wealth at retirement age, its income will be higher, and it 
will be possible to avoid significant increases in contribution rates. 
The extent to which tax incentives and subsidies increase savings is an empirically unresolved 
issue. For the eligible households, even the theory does not offer a clear prediction because of 
                                                           
1 As is well known from theory, a transition from a pay-as-you-go to a funded scheme cannot yield a Pareto 
improvement  unless  special  externalities  or  other  market  imperfections  are  present.  See  Breyer  (2001)  and 
Corneo and Marquardt (2000). 
2 Studies on private old-age provision in other countries suggest that these costs are potentially high. For the US, 
see Diamond (2004). 3 
 
countervailing  income  and  substitution  effects  from  a  savings  subsidy.
3  Furthermore, 
subsidizing  private  pension  schemes  may  alter  the  saving  behavior  of  non-eligible 
households. Households without an operating bequest motive may save less simply because 
the tax required to finance the subsidy reduces their disposable income. Households with an 
operating bequest motive may save less in order to optimally counteract the intergenerational 
distributive effect that stems from that policy. Tax exemptions and subsidies also affect the 
savings of the public sector. If their long-term budgetary implications are negative – which is 
likely if there are no new private savings – explicit public debt will actually increase. Finally, 
the firm sector may also adjust its savings in response to the government’s promotion of 
private pension schemes, e.g. because firms choose to alter the retirement plans they offer to 
their employees. 
In the current paper we investigate the effectiveness of the Riester scheme with respect 
to the savings of private households. At first glance, about 11 million Riester contracts signed 
until the end of March 2008 (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2008) suggest 
that the savings of eligible households were strongly increased by the reform. However, the 
sheer number of contracts is not sufficient to make that inference: eligible households might 
have  just  replaced  non-subsidized  savings  with  subsidized  ones.  Evidence  from  other 
countries does suggest that private savings are often diverted by tax-favored schemes.
4
  
In  our  empirical  examination  we  focus  on  low-income  households.  This  group  is 
particularly  interesting  for  two  reasons.  First,  low-income  households  enjoy  the  highest 
subsidies in relative terms. Second, low-income households’ ability to substitute non-favored 
with subsidized contracts is rather low as compared to richer households, be it because of 
their lower financial literacy, or because they save less. A mobilization effect of the Riester 
reform  on  private  savings  should  thus  be  most  pronounced  in  the  case  of  low-income 
households. 
We employ data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), and interpret the 
introduction of the Riester scheme as a natural experiment affecting the saving propensity of 
a treatment group (i.e. low-income households) relative to a control group.
5 Our approach 
allows for several variations concerning group composition, the set of conditioning variables, 
and the estimation method. These variations serve as a device for checking the robustness of 
our results. 
                                                           
3 For a microeconomic analysis of the Riester scheme, see Prinz et al. (2003). 
4 See Antolín et al. (2004, Annex 2) for an overview of the results. The dominant part of the literature deals with 
experience from the US.  
5
 See Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) for an overview of the methods.  4 
 
At  face  value,  our  estimations  suggest  that  the  mobilization  effect  of  the  Riester 
scheme  is  at  best  marginal.  However,  our  results  are  subject  to  significant  uncertainties 
concerning the interpretation of the savings variable and the identification of a proper control 
group. Hence, it is not possible to draw from our exercise clear-cut implications about the 
effectiveness  of  the  Riester  scheme  in  stimulating  private  savings.  No  doubt,  given  its 
potentially large economic and financial implications, the Riester reform deserves a careful 
evaluation, and the current paper should merely be seen as a first step in clarifying some 
empirical issues at stake. 
 
2 The Riester scheme 
The  Riester  scheme  started  operating  in  2002.  Beneficiaries  receive  allowances  (a  basic 
allowance  and  child  allowances),  and  can  lower  their  income  tax  liability  by  means  of 
deductions. The allowance is paid when a minimum saving effort is achieved. The allowance 
and the personal saving effort must add up to a total saving amount, which is proportional to 
the individual’s income subject to social insurance contributions.
6  
The target groups are middle and low income households, women, families and people 
with residence in the New German Laender (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
2006a). A remarkable portion of the active population in Germany is eligible, estimates going 
from 30 to 36 million people.
7 Basically, all compulsorily insured persons in the German 
public pension system are eligible for Riester contracts. In addition, public servants, trainees, 
individuals in the mandatory military or social service, and the recipients of some types of 
public transfers (e.g., unemployment benefits) may participate. Usually, persons that are not 
statutorily insured in the mandatory public pension system are not eligible; those persons 
include marginal employees and students, social welfare recipients, senior citizens receiving a 
pension, and persons receiving disability benefits.
8  
Besides allowances and tax reliefs, Riester contracts may be advantageous for other 
reasons.  First,  Riester  contributions,  allowances  and  proceeds  are  subject  to  downstream 
                                                           
6 The minimum saving amount is defined as a share of the income subject to social insurance contribution of the 
previous year including the allowances. This share has increased stepwise from one percent (introduction of the 
Riester scheme) to four percent (from 2008) (so-called “Riester steps”). Also the allowances and the maximal 
amount of expenditures have denoted a stepwise increase since the Riester scheme was introduced. Börsch-
Supan and Wilke (2003) provide a detailed introduction to the German pension system and its recent reforms, 
including the Riester scheme.  
7  Compare  the  statements  made  by  the  Federal  Government  (Federal  Ministry  of  Finance,  2006)  and  by 
Bräuninger (2005). According to Stolz and Rieckhoff (2005), the reason for the deviations lies in the difficulty to 
identify the number of indirectly eligible persons (spouses).   
8 However, eligibility regulations are very detailed and include a broad range of exemptions. See the publications 
by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2006b) for further details.   5 
 
taxation, so that taxpayers can benefit from tax deferral. Second, after-retirement income is 
usually  lower  than  pre-retirement  income.  As  the  German  income  tax  is  progressive, 
households can benefit from a decline in their personal effective tax rates (Börsch-Supan and 
Wilke,  2003).  Third,  there  are  special  beneficial  regulations  in  case  of  unemployment  to 
protect the saved capital against garnishment.   
 
3 Econometric model and data 
We scrutinize the impact of the Riester scheme on households’ saving propensities by means 
of a treatment analysis. In order to assess the causal effect of the reform, we compare pre- and 
post-reform propensities to save for two groups, a treatment group (TG) and a control group 
(CG).
9
 Since people might have anticipated the Riester reform and correspondingly adjusted 
their pre-reform savings, we use the year 2000 and not 2001 as the pre-reform point in time. 
As people might adjust savings with delay, three post-reform years are considered, from 2004 
to 2006. The 2000-2004 comparison is our preferred one, as 2005 or 2006 savings are likely 
to be affected by other factors as well, such as the introduction of so-called Rürup pensions in 
2005.
10  
We apply two different criteria to distinguish ‘treated’ and ‘non-treated’ households.  
They are summarized in Table 1. In the main approach, income - our proxy for the subsidy 
ratio - serves as the classification criterion. The subsidy ratio is the public subsidy (allowances 
and tax deductions) divided by the total savings amount for additional old-age provision. It is 
a relative measure of the gain that the insured can realize thanks to the subsidy. Figure 1 
shows subsidy ratios depending on the wage income of a sole earner.  Compared to low-
income earners, the subsidy ratio is much lower in the middle-income range. Whereas insured 
persons with low incomes especially benefit from direct allowances, high-income earners can 
realize  substantial  benefits  from  tax  deductions,  explaining  the  U-shaped  relationships 
between earnings and subsidy ratios in Figure 1.  
In our econometric analysis, we assign households with an annual net income level of 
25,000 Euros or below (reference year: 2002)
11
 to the treatment group (TG1). The control 
group (CG1) are households with a net income between 35,000 and 45,000 Euros (reference 
                                                           
9 Baumgartner and Steiner (2006) discuss the limitations of such a treatment analysis. 
10 So-called “Rürup pensions” are subsidized private retirement saving contracts especially targeting people that 
are not mandatorily insured in the German pension scheme, e.g. self-employed. Contributions are tax-deductible, 
and the accumulated capital is repaid as a monthly annuity (Federal Ministry of Finance, no year).  
11 Starting with the reference year 2002, the income level was adjusted to the other points in time according to 
the average income increase since 1992 by applying a growth rate that is equal to the average annual growth rate 
of the net income between 1992 and 2002 (2.05%) according to the German Sample Survey of income and 
expenditure of 2003 (Federal Statistical Office, 2003a). 6 
 
year: 2002) and notably lower subsidy ratios.
12 We restrict the treatment analysis to a special 
type of households, namely Riester-eligible married couples with two children living in the 
household.
13
 For pre- and post-reform years, for each and every household we check whether 
an  adult  household  member  was  or  is  eligible  (if  the  Riester  scheme  had  existed  in  that 
period). All information is aggregated at the household level.  In sum, the main approach 
exploits  the  fact  that  subsidy  ratios  differ  widely  among  rather  similar  households.  It 
quantifies the additional mobilization or incremental effect of higher subsidy ratios in the 
treated group. 
A drawback of our main approach is the relatively low number of observations. Hence, 
we  also  pursue  an  audit  approach  where  eligibility  for  a  Riester  contract  serves  as  the 
classification criterion. Eligible households with a net income below average
14 and at most 
two adults form the treatment group in the audit approach (TG2).
15 The control group consists 
of non-eligible households, again with an income below average and two adults at most. Only 
households with up to two adults are considered because saving behavior of household units 
with several adults (e.g., three generation households) might be quite different. 
 
Table 1 approximately here 
  
Compared to the main approach, the advantages of the audit approach are twofold: 
regression estimates are less likely to be affected by income heterogeneity and the number of 
observations is substantially higher. On the other hand, average age in the treated and non-
treated group is rather different, as many non-eligible households are pensioners. This age 
                                                           
12 The subsidy ratios displayed in Figure 1 refers to households with a sole earner and no further income. Due to 
the complexity of information that is required to calculate individual subsidy ratios, we take the assumption that 
households with a lower net income enjoy (ceteris paribus) higher subsidy ratios in the lower and middle income 
range as drafted in Figure 1 for the wage income.   
13 We assume that students do not renounce their right to be exempt from paying social security contributions, so 
that they are not eligible for the Riester scheme if they earn less than 400 Euros. For some observations, we 
cannot  check  for  a  potential  eligibility  for  the  Riester  scheme,  especially  for  marginal  employed  and  self-
employed without employees. A further problem results from the recipients of public payments for the founders 
of new businesses since the GSOEP does not contain information on whether such a subsidy was received. Also, 
the status of non-commercial care persons cannot be observed properly. We exclude households for which we 
cannot identify the eligibility for the Riester scheme.  
14 The average net income is again derived from the German Sample Survey of income and expenditure of 2003. 
15 Alternatively, we could have formed several treatment groups subject to the share of household members 
eligible for the Riester scheme. Under the assumption that only households with at most two adults make a joint 
decision on savings that is observed in the GSOEP household questionnaire, this would lead to two treatment 
groups with a share of 50 percent and, respectively, 100 percent of eligible household members. However, a 
comparison of the composition of these treatment groups shows fluctuations for the 50-percent-group so that we 
only include households in which all adult members are eligible for the Riester scheme in order to assure that the 
single group compositions can be compared over time. If a mobilization effect on the propensity to save can be 
observed, it is likely to be strongest among households with a high share of members eligible for the Riester 
scheme. Therefore, our findings are also valid with some reservations for households in which some members 
are not eligible for the Riester scheme.  7 
 
difference complicates the interpretation of our empirical results in two respects. First, the age 
gradient of the saving propensity is large and non-monotonic so that sample aging between 
2000  and  2004/5/6  might  have  rather  different  effects  on  the  saving  behavior  in  the  two 
groups. Second, the introduction of the Riester scheme was accompanied by cuts of public 
pension  entitlements,  and  these  cuts  will  widen  in  future  decades.  As  a  consequence, 
incentives to provide for one’s own age privately are likely to be different for treated and non-
treated households. Hence, if the saving activity of TG2 households rises faster relative to 
CG2 households, the difference is likely to be driven by both, eligibility/non-eligibility to 
Riester subsidies and different expected pension cuts. We therefore tend to believe that the 
main approach is more appropriate for assessing the mobilization effect of the Riester scheme.  
 
Figure 1. Subsidy ratios of the Riester scheme 
 
 
Income subject to contributions in thousands of Euros p.a.  
Light grey: single, no children.  
Dark grey: single, one child.  
Black: married, sole earner, two children.  
Public subsidy ratio of the total savings amount for additional old-age provision (illustration from Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2002, 29, modified). 
 
In the regression analysis that follows, two variables serve as dependent variables and 
measures of households’ propensities to save: a dummy variable that indicates whether  a 
household  saves  or  not  (SOEP  variable  “monthly  savings”),  and  the  saving  ratio  (SOEP 
variable “monthly  amount of savings” divided  by  “household net income”).
16 Among the 
                                                           
16 The exact wording in the SOEP questionnaire reads as follows: “Do you usually have an amount of money left 
over at the end of the month that you can save for larger purchases, emergency expenses or to acquire wealth? If 
yes, how much?” (see SOEP online documentation: http://www.diw.de/english/questionnaires/33919.html). This 
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control variables we include the following ones: ownership of special assets such as building 
loan  contract,  life  insurance,  fixed-interest  securities,  securities  (e.g.  shares,  funds,  bond 
issues,  warrants)  or  business  and  real  estate  property.  Other  control  variables  include  the 
repaying of mortgage or building loans, credit loans and interest.  
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Impact on the probability to save 
We use a binary logit model to explain households’ probabilities to save. In period  t, each 
household, i, has a latent probability to save, 
* SP , but only its saving decision (yes/no),  SP , 
can be observed directly. Our regression model is  
       (4.1)  it it it it it it N R N R SP e d g b a + + + + × = it
* X ) (  
       (4.2)  1 Pr[ = it SP ]=Pr ], 0 [
* > it SP  
where  
·  R is a dummy variable. It takes a value of one if a household belongs to the treatment 
group and zero otherwise. 
·  N is a dummy variable. It takes a value of one if the observation refers to a post-
reform period, otherwise it is zero. 
·  X is a vector of control variables, and 
·  e is the error term. 
 
Tables 2a and 2b display the logit estimates pertaining to the main approach.  For all three 
inter-temporal comparisons (2000 vs. 2004, 2000 vs. 2005, and 2000 vs. 2006), estimates of 
three model specifications are provided. Specifications differ with respect to the set of  control 
variables. Column A contains the estimates pertaining to a regression specification without 
any  control  variable,  whereas  column  B  reports  estimates  of  a  specification  where  socio-
demographic household characteristics are included.
17 Finally, column C reports estimates for 
a specification encompassing the full set of conditioning variables.  
The additional mobilization effect of the Riester reform on private savings for the 
treatment group is revealed by the coefficient a  referring to the interaction term,  N R× . The 
interaction term takes the value 1 in case of post-reform observations referring to treated 
households, otherwise it is zero. Hence,  0 > a  and significant would be evidence in favor of 
                                                           
17 In the main approach, only married couples with two children are considered. For this reason, we do not 
control for the numbers of adults and children. 9 
 
effectiveness of the reform in creating new savings. Instead, irrespective of the regression 
specification and the chosen observation, the interaction term is statistically insignificant. This 
finding suggests that high subsidy ratios in the treatment group did not have an additional 
effect on these households’ probabilities to save. 
Several control variables have a robust influence on the saving probability. The saving 
probability is increasing in income (at a decreasing rate in 2000/2005). A higher probability to 
save  is  also  associated  with  ownership  of  various  types  of  assets,  or  of  real  estate 
( 0 , , > ESTATE SEC BOOKS D D D ). In contrast, unemployment and repayments of real-estate credit 
have a robust and negative influence on the probability to save ( 0 , 1 < REPAY UN D D ). The same 
holds if the household head is female ( 0 < FEM D ). Other control variables have no robust 
effect on the probability to save. 
Table 3a and Table 3b display the logit estimates in case of the audit approach. Since 
in  the  audit  approach  household  composition  can  differ,  the  number  of  children  and  the 
number of adults are included as additional control variables. Furthermore, in order to control 
for heterogeneity of age structures in TG2 and CG2, a fourth degree polynomial for the age 
variable is included.
18 
The main results from the audit approach are close to those from the main approach. 
The interaction term is statistically insignificant in all nine regressions, suggesting that the 
Riester scheme had no stimulating effect on the probability to save. The results of the main 
approach concerning the socio-economic variables are also confirmed in all periods, for the 
gender effect only for the periods 2000 vs. 2004 and 2000 vs. 2005. In addition, residence in 
the  New  German  Laender  ( 0 > NL D )  now  has  a  robust  and  positive  effect  on  the  saving 
probability, whereas (in case of 2000 vs. 2004, and 2000 vs. 2005) households with a head 
being a white-collar worker save more frequently ( 0 > WC D ). Foreign workers, unemployed 
and  self-employed  individuals  save  less  frequently  ( 0 , , < SE UN FO D D D ),
19  whereas  holding 
different types of assets, or owning real-estate, is usually associated with a higher saving 
probability  ( 0 , , , , > ESTATE SEC LIVE LOAN BOOKS D D D D D ).  In  addition,  the  saving  probability  is 
increasing in household size ( 0 , < ADULTS CHILD N N ). Finally, households save less frequently if 
                                                           




the tables. The regression coefficient for (age)
3 is significantly positive, significantly negative for (age)
4.  
19 The fact that self-employed save significantly more rarely may surprise at first. However, this group also 
includes freelancers who are covered by the statutory social insurance institutions and therefore do not have to 
rely  more  strongly  on  private  old-age  provision  than  other  compulsorily  insured  individuals.  The  so-called 
“Scheinselbstständige“ (self-employed who are effectively dependent on only one client) with a low income also 
form part of this group. 10 
 
they have to repay housing loans or credits ( 0 , 2 1 < REPAY REPAY D D ).
20
 To check for robustness, 
all logit regressions were re-run using a probit model. Again, the interaction term is always 
statistically insignificant.    
 
Tables 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b approximately here 
 
4.2 Impact on the saving ratio  
As saving ratios are restricted to the 0-1-interval and are not normally distributed, we use a 
tobit  model  for  quantifying  the  mobilization  effect  of  the  Riester  reform  on  households’ 
saving ratios. Except for the left-hand variable, the tobit model specification is structurally 
equivalent to the logit model in the previous section, and is given by 
  (4.3)        
) , 0 ( ~ X , , ), (






e d g b a
N N R N R
N R N R sp
it it it it it
it it it it it it
×
+ + + + × =
  
       (4.4)       ) , 0 max(
*
it it sp sp =  
where 
* sp  denotes the latent saving ratio, and sp the reported saving ratio. 
We will first comment on the main approach (see Tables 4a and 4b). Consistently with the 
results  presented  in  the  previous  Section,  the  interaction  terms  are  always  statistically 
insignificant. In combination with the logit results, this suggests that the Riester reform has 
neither a mobilizing effect on the saving probability nor on the saving ratio. The picture is 
less distinct for the audit approach (Table 5a and Table 5b). Here, the interaction term is 
small but significantly positive for some regression specifications (C 2000/2004, B and C in 
2000/2006,  and  weakly  significant  in  2000/2005).
21  If  our  control  variables  are  able  to 
capture the effects of the different age structure, these findings suggest that savings increased 
as a consequence of the pension policy measures introduced during the period 2000 to 2006. 
Then, the significance of the interaction term might reflect an impact of future pension cuts 
on households’ saving decisions, rather than an impact of the Riester scheme. The effects of 
the  control  variables  on  the  saving  ratio  are  widely  consistent  with  those  from  the  logit 
estimation. We refrain from commenting on the respective coefficients here.   
                                                           
20 Estimates pertaining to the further control variables (i.e., income, unemployment, household size, number of 
children, existence of different forms of saving in the household, obligations from credits and housing loans) are 
consistent with other empirical investigations. See e.g. Bedau (1999), Börsch-Supan et al. (2000), Börsch-Supan 
et al. (2006), Federal Statistical Office (2003b), Freyland (2005). 
21 Again, we account for the different age structure of the two groups by using a fourth degree polynomial for 
‘age’.  11 
 
 
Tables  4a, 4b, 5a and 5b approximately here 
 
4.3 Treatment and control group composition 
A requirement for the validity of treatment analysis is that the socioeconomic characteristics 
of the treatment and the control group are inter-temporally stable, or that compositions change 
similarly. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix give summary statistics concerning the socio-
economic characteristics of the treated and the control group for the years 2000 and 2004 to 
2006. Overall, group compositions do not show remarkable structural changes. However, all 
groups age slightly over the observation period.  
In case of the main approach, socioeconomic characteristics of treated and non-treated 
households  are  rather  similar  and  stable  over  time.  Most  pronounced  are  the  differences 
pertaining to the income variable, which in turn depend on the employment status of the 
household head. In TG1, the share of unemployed household heads is notably higher than in 
CG1. Moreover, the share of households with residence in the New German Laender in CG1 
is considerably lower in 2005. To avoid potential biases driven by those differences, we re-ran 
all  regressions  pertaining  to  the  main  approach,  excluding  all  unemployed  and  also 
households  from  the  New  German  Laender.  Again,  there  is  no  evidence  in  favor  of  a 
mobilization effect of the Riester reform: The interaction term is insignificant in all but one of 
the 18 additional specifications, weakly significant in the main approach (B, 2000/ 2005, see 
Tables A3a, A3b, A4a, and A4b in the Appendix).  
In  the  audit  approach,  average  household  size  decreases  whereas  the  fraction  of 
pensioner households rises over time. This is true for both the group of treated and non-
treated households. Yet, there is the following concern. In TG2, the share of unemployed 
household  heads  is  rather  volatile  over  time,  whereas  for  CG2  it  is  always  zero.
22  As 
unemployed  people  usually  save  less,  we  cannot  rule  out  that  our  regression  results  are 
downward biased. For this reason, we re-ran all audit regressions excluding all observations 
where the household head is unemployed;
23
 Tables A5a, A5b, A6a, and A6b in the Appendix 
summarize the results of that exercise. Logit estimates contain weak evidence in favor of a 
slight mobilization effect in 2006. Interaction terms in the tobit regressions are significant in 
all specifications for the 2000/2006 comparison, in specification C for 2000/2004, and they 
are weakly significant in specifications B and C for 2000/2005.  
                                                           
22 Apart from macroeconomic reasons, a new classification guideline to distinguish among unemployed and non-
unemployed may cause this volatility (see Federal Employment Agency, 2005, for details). 
23Again, we account for the different age structure in the two groups by using a fourth degree polynomial for the 
age.  12 
 
5 Limitations of the current analysis 
All in all, our analysis casts some doubts about the effectiveness of the Riester scheme in 
fostering  private  savings.  However,  we  refrain  from  drawing  clear-cut  conclusions  and 
recommend  much  caution  in  interpreting  the  econometric  results  presented  above.  While 
some caveats concerning our empirical strategy have already been mentioned, there are two 
that still need being discussed. 
The first qualification concerns our savings measure. It is derived from the answers 
given by SOEP-respondents to the survey question that we have reproduced in Footnote 16 of 
the  current  paper.  That  question  asks  about  a  person’s  money  which  can  be  saved,  in 
particular, in order to acquire wealth. Apparently, someone who has signed a Riester contract 
should consider the saving amount required by his or her Riester contract as money that is 
voluntarily saved to acquire wealth. If this was the way in which that survey question is 
interpreted by all persons with a Riester contract, finding no effect of the Riester scheme on 
the propensity to save would strongly suggest that some savers simply shifted their savings 
from unsubsidized assets to subsidized ones. However, drawing such an inference may be 
immature  because  some  respondents  with  a  Riester  contract  may  not  consider  the 
corresponding saving effort when answering that survey question. Those respondents might 
have  “chosen”  to  forget  the  voluntary  nature  of  the  Riester  scheme  so  as  to  avoid  the 
temptation to withdraw money from the accumulated savings. 
Whatever  its  rationale,  it  appears  that  some  respondents  with  a  Riester  contract 
actually  do  not  count  its  saving  requirement  as  savings  according  to  the  SOEP  survey 
question. This can be verified for the year 2006 since in that year – but not in 2004 and 2005 - 
the SOEP asked whether the respondent has a Riester contract. As a matter of fact, many 
respondents that claimed to have a Riester contract declared zero savings.
24 
At this stage we cannot assess the extent to which this way of interpreting the SOEP 
question about savings invalidates the inference of ineffectiveness of the Riester scheme. To 
be sure, if every respondent in each year fully neglected his or her Riester saving effort, the 
interpretation  of  our  econometric  results  would  be  a  completely  different  one:  each  Euro 
contribution to a Riester plan would be interpreted as one Euro of new savings. However, it 
                                                           
24 This finding is not unique for Riester contracts but holds also for other regular forms of savings such as 
building loan contracts. Therefore, the fact that some respondents with regular savings claim not to save at all 
seems  to  be  a  systematic  problem  of  the  GSOEP  savings  variables.  The  number  of  observations  that  are 
contradictory with respect to savings is not negligible.  
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seems hazardous to extrapolate from 2006 what might have occurred in the years before, e.g. 
because the saliency of the Riester scheme is likely to have declined over time. 
The second qualification concerns the definition of the control groups that allowed us 
to  treat  the  Riester  scheme  as  a  natural  experiment.  If  the  Riester  scheme  had  no  or  a 
negligible effect on the saving propensity of the control groups, evidence in support of a 
positive  saving  differential  for  the  treatment  group  would  suggest  that  the  scheme  was 
effective in creating savings. However, the Riester scheme might have  caused  a negative 
effect on the saving ratio of the control groups, in which case a positive saving differential for 
the treatment group does not imply effectiveness with respect to aggregate private savings. 
This  issue  is  particularly  relevant  for  our  audit  approach.  In  that  case,  the  control 
group is mainly formed by old people. Their saving behavior is likely to be affected by the 
altruistic motive to leave a bequest to their children. Most of those children will however be 
eligible for the Riester subsidy and will be expected to benefit from it. This makes bequests 
less valuable from the viewpoint of the donors. Hence, the introduction of the Riester scheme 
may have had a negative effect on the saving propensity of the control group in the audit 
approach. 
In the main approach, the control group is formed by households with a low subsidy 
rate. If the Riester scheme is not self-financing – a rather realistic conjecture – households in 
that control group, together with the non-eligible households, are likely to be the fiscal losers 
of the Riester scheme: their tax burden increases. In that case, the introduction of the Riester 
scheme  actually  lowered  the  disposable  income  of  the  households  in  the  control  group, 




A pivotal criterion for judging the success of the Riester reform in Germany is whether it 
mobilizes private retirement savings, especially among low-income households. This paper 
has offered an empirical analysis based on data from the German SOEP that begins to shed 
light on that question. Our results seem to suggest that, at best, the mobilization effect upon 
private savings has been small. However, serious doubts about how to interpret our empirical 
findings remain because, first, the saving measure in the SOEP questionnaire might possibly 
be ill-suited for our purposes and, second, the assumptions underlying the treatment of the 
Riester scheme as a natural experiment might be untenable. While the first problem would 
                                                           
25 As a matter of fact, whenever the estimated coefficient on the post-reform dummy was statistically significant, 
it carried a negative sign. 14 
 
lead us to underestimate the effectiveness of the Riester scheme, the second one would lead us 
to overestimate it. Given such uncertainties and the potentially far-reaching consequences of 
the Riester scheme, further policy evaluations are highly desirable. 
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Table 1. Treatment and control group definition   
Main approach 
Treatment group 
Name  Adults  Children  Income*  Eligibility for the Riester scheme ** 
TG1  Two  Two  < Euro 25,000   100 percent 
Control group 
Name  Adults  Children  Income*  Eligibility for the Riester scheme ** 
CG1  Two  Two  Euro 35,000–45,000   100 percent 
Audit approach 
Treatment group 
Name  Adults  Children  Income *  Eligibility for the Riester scheme ** 
TG2  Two or less  All  Below average  100 percent 
Control group 
Name  Adults  Children  Income *  Eligibility for the Riester scheme ** 
CG2  Two or less  All  Below average  0 percent 
* Reference year: 2002.  
**Potential eligibility for the Riester scheme of the adult household members. 
 
  
Table 2a. Probability to save – logit estimation, main approach 
  
   
 
2000/2004  2000/2005 









0.219  3.033  3.274  0.219  3.266  3.609 
Observation  point  after  the 
reform (dummy) 
PR D   -0.137  -0.530  -0.534  -0.046  -0.207  -0.305 
0.315  0.376  0.399  0.330  0.392  0.418 
Belonging to treatment group 1 
(dummy) 





*  1.121 
0.251  0.702  0.746  0.251  0.697  0.729 
Interaction term 
1 T PR D D ×   0.168  0.216  0.199  -0.142  -0.508  -0.429 
0.373  0.437  0.462  0.383  0.454  0.484 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     2.779
**  2.571
**    4.468
***  4.242
*** 
  1.140  1.219    1.194  1.271 
Household income in thousand 
Euro, squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.161  -0.138    -0.563
**  -0.542
** 
  0.252  0.266    0.257  0.270 
Head of the household is 
unemployed (dummy) 
UN D     -1.379
***  -1.154
***    -0.992
***  -0.840
** 
  0.392  0.411    0.365  0.396 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.443  -0.179    -0.093  0.081 
  0.370  0.416    0.413  0.466 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     0.765  0.513    1.082
*  1.025
* 
  0.556  0.574    0.577  0.611 
Head of the household is 
pensioner (dummy) 
PE D     -0.302  -0.077    -1.229  -0.733 
  1.264  1.671    1.633  2.305 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.165  -0.002    0.380  0.265 
  0.250  0.270    0.247  0.268 
Head of the household is 
student (dummy) 
ST D     -2.560
**  -2.496
**    -0.736  -0.655 
  1.290  1.271    1.031  1.002 
Head of the household with 
other employment type 
OE D     -0.104  -0.170    0.120  0.128 
  0.353  0.383    0.353  0.387 
Head of the household is 
foreigner (dummy) 
FO D     -0.556
**  -0.369    -0.583
**  -0.267 
  0.258  0.285    0.259  0.295 
Head of the household has 
univ. entrance qualific. 
UEQ D     0.290  0.212    -0.218  -0.205 
  0.305  0.320    0.298  0.316 
Head of household has 
university degree (dummy) 
UD D     -0.058  0.096    0.287  0.380 
  0.313  0.332    0.316  0.337 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.573
**  -0.608
**    -0.658
***  -0.830
*** 
  0.238  0.254    0.240  0.259 
Age of the head of the  
household  
Age    0.242
*  0.213    0.337
**  0.314
** 
  0.131  0.143    0.142  0.158 
Age of the head of the  
household, squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.003
**  -0.003
*    -0.005
***  -0.005
** 
  0.002  0.002    0.002  0.002 
Household from New Laender 
(dummy) 
NL D     0.143  0.047    0.117  -0.076 
  0.246  0.260    0.253  0.272 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       0.947
***      1.379
*** 
    0.257      0.271 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.192      0.316 
    0.212      0.216 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       0.043      -0.054 
    0.242      0.244 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.915
***      0.865
*** 
    0.234      0.232 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.853
**      -0.357 
    0.389      0.433 
Household has to repay 
building loans/mortgages 
1 REPAY D       -1.355
***      -1.416
*** 
    0.379      0.376 
Household has to repay credit 
loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.414
**      -0.130 
    0.201      0.211 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       1.175
***      1.273
*** 
    0.371      0.370 
Number of observations  713  713  713  717  717  717 
Log Likelihood  -430.15  -375.85  -340.29  -430.41  -373.95  -331.45 
2 R Pseudo   0.11  0.22  0.29  0.12  0.24  0.32 
Remarks. Logit estimation. Endogeneous variable: Saving decision (dummy : 1=yes ; 0=no). 
***/
**/
* Significance on the 
1/5/10-%-level. 
 Table 2b. Probability to save – logit estimation, main approach 
  
   
 
2000/2006 
A  B  C 
Constant 
Const  1.585***  -8.331***  -7.119** 
0.220  2.735  2.893 
Observation  point  after  the 
reform (dummy) 
PR D   -0.386  -0.257  -0.406 
0.287  0.313  0.336 
Belonging to treatment group 1 
(dummy) 
1 T D   -1.792***  0.238  -0.036 
0.251  0.467  0.496 
Interaction term 
1 T PR D D ×   0.055  -0.292  -0.157 
0.352  0.404  0.432 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     3.015***  2.591** 
  0.958  1.020 
Household income in thousand 
Euro, squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.375**  -0.314* 
  0.179  0.189 
Head of the household is 
unemployed (dummy) 
UN D     -1.370***  -1.134*** 
  0.371  0.392 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.409  -0.655 
  0.364  0.439 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     0.552  0.380 
  0.501  0.524 
Head of the household is 
pensioner (dummy) 
PE D     -0.403  -0.118 
  1.107  1.305 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.053  -0.046 
  0.237  0.256 
Head of the household is 
student (dummy) 
ST D     -1.453  -1.585 
  1.328  1.287 
Head of the household with 
other employment type 
OE D     0.092  0.117 
  0.333  0.361 
Head of the household is 
foreigner (dummy) 
FO D     -0.326  -0.195 
  0.250  0.278 
Head of the household has 
univ. entrance qualific. 
UEQ D     -0.312  -0.370 
  0.307  0.325 
Head of household has 
university degree (dummy) 
UD D     0.262  0.399 
  0.319  0.339 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.412*  -0.612** 
  0.234  0.252 
Age of the head of the  
household  
Age    0.239**  0.177 
  0.118  0.124 
Age of the head of the  
household, squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.003**  -0.003* 
  0.001  0.002 
Household from New Laender 
(dummy) 
NL D     0.142  0.093 
  0.240  0.256 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       1.201*** 
    0.246 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.223 
    0.201 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       0.050 
    0.232 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.785*** 
    0.219 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.049 
    0.434 
Household has to repay 
building loans/mortgages 
1 REPAY D       -1.611*** 
    0.362 
Household has to repay credit 
loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.135 
    0.202 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       1.211*** 
    0.358 
Number of observations  743  743  743 
Log Likelihood  -448.23  -405.46  -363.18 
2 R Pseudo   0.11  0,20  0,28  
Table 3a. Probability to save – logit estimation, audit approach 
  
 
2000/2004  2000/2005 









0.039  1.193  1.252  0.039  1.212  1.273 
Observation  point  after  the 
reform (dummy) 
PR D   -0.130
**  -0.423
***  -0.438
***  -0.048  -0.357
***  -0.352
*** 
0.056  0.063  0.066  0.057  0.064  0.068 
Belonging to treatment 
group 2 (dummy) 
2 T D   -0.204
***  0.0005  0.004  -0.204
***  0.115  0.139 
0.049  0.088  0.093  0.049  0.089  0.094 
Interaction term  2 T PR D D ×
 
-0.115  0.033  0.075  -0.117  0.058  0.044 
0.072  0.080  0.085  0.073  0.083  0.087 
Household income in 





***    3.695
***  3.562
*** 
  0.202  0.213    0.199  0.209 
Household income in 






***    -0.642
***  -0.627
*** 
  0.060  0.064    0.059  0.062 
Head of the household is 
unemployed (dummy) 
UN D     -0.843
***  -0.870
***    -0.838
***  -0.887
*** 
  0.089  0.095    0.089  0.096 
Head of the household is 
self-employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.525
***  -0.376
***    -0.581
***  -0.505
*** 
  0.113  0.129    0.116  0.133 
Head of the household is 
public servant (dummy) 
PS D     0.077  -0.013    0.140  0.054 
  0.149  0.157    0.152  0.160 
Head of the household is 
pensioner (dummy) 
PE D     0.043  -0.032    0.099  0.030 
  0.095  0.101    0.098  0.103 
Head of the household is 
white-collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.236
***  0.135
**    0.253
***  0.133
** 
  0.062  0.066    0.064  0.068 
Head of the household is 
student (dummy) 
ST D     -0.212  -0.458
***    0.128  -0.084 
  0.143  0.149    0.144  0.149 
Head of the household with 
other employment type 
OE D     -0.196
**  -0.235
**    -0.048  -0.092 
  0.094  0.102    0.097  0.104 
Head of the household is 
foreigner (dummy) 
FO D     -0.462
***  -0.247
***    -0.460
***  -0.242
*** 
  0.076  0.082    0.077  0.083 
Head of the household has 
univ. entrance qualification 
UEQ D     0.099  -0.019    0.076  -0.042 
  0.068  0.071    0.069  0.073 
Head of household has 
university degree (dummy) 
UD D     0.013  -0.009    0.010  -0.024 
  0.068  0.072    0.070  0.074 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.089
**  -0.088
*    -0.117
***  -0.110
** 
  0.045  0.048    0.046  0.048 
Age of the head of the  
household  
Age    0.143  0.171    0.236
**  0.247
** 
  0.101  0.106    0.103  0.108 
Age of the head of the  
household, squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.007
**  -0.007
**    -0.010
***  -0.010
*** 
  0.003  0.003    0.003  0.003 
Household from New 
Laender (dummy) 
NL D     0.453
***  0.507
***    0.464
***  0.504
*** 
  0.047  0.050    0.048  0.051 
Household has a savings 
book (dummy) 
BOOKS D       1.156
***      1.147
*** 
    0.050      0.050 
Household has a building 
loan contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.399
***      0.291
*** 
    0.050      0.051 
Household has a life 
insurance (dummy) 
LIVE D       0.123
***      0.077 
    0.048      0.049 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.504
***      0.526
*** 
    0.052      0.054 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.237
*      -0.078 
    0.142      0.150 
Household has to repay 
building loans/mortgages 
1 REPAY D       -0.585
***      -0.705
*** 
    0.077      0.079 
Household has to repay 
credit loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.776
***      -0.738
*** 
    0.053      0.056 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.251
***      0.308
*** 
    0.059      0.061 
Number of children in the 
household 
CHILDS N     -0.367
***  -0.340
***    -0.400
***  -0.379
*** 
  0.031  0.034    0.033  0.035 






***    -0.501
***  -0.561
*** 
  0.055  0.059    0.056  0.060 
Number of observations  13,593  13,593  13,593  13,268  13,268  13,268 
Log Likelihood  -9,228.29  -7,816.90  -7,139.94  -8,978.29  -7,529.41  -6,899.26 
2 R Pseudo   0.01  0.16  0.23  0.00  0.16  0.23 
Remarks. Endogeneous variable: Saving decision (dummy : 1=yes ; 0=no). 
***/
**/
* Significance on the 1/5/10-%-level. 
  
 




A  B  C 
Constant 
Const  0.557***  -3.038**  -3.925*** 
0.039  1.220  1.286 
Observation  point  after  the 
reform (dummy) 
PR D   -0.202***  -0.560***  -0.555*** 
0.055  0.062  0.066 
Belonging to treatment 
group 2 (dummy) 
2 T D   -0.239***  0.052  0.081 
0.049  0.089  0.094 
Interaction term  2 T PR D D ×
 
-0.056  0.130  0.129 
0.070  0.080  0.085 
Household income in 
thousand Euro  
1000 y
 
  3.955***  3.759*** 
  0.193  0.204 
Household income in 




  -0.707***  -0.673*** 
  0.056  0.059 
Head of the household is 
unemployed (dummy) 
UN D     -0.972***  -0.991*** 
  0.089  0.096 
Head of the household is 
self-employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.569***  -0.466*** 
  0.110  0.125 
Head of the household is 
public servant (dummy) 
PS D     0.142  0.037 
  0.152  0.159 
Head of the household is 
pensioner (dummy) 
PE D     -0.033  -0.104 
  0.096  0.102 
Head of the household is 
white-collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.161**  0.049 
  0.062  0.066 
Head of the household is 
student (dummy) 
ST D     -0.394**  -0.592*** 
  0.153  0.159 
Head of the household with 
other employment type 
OE D     -0.159*  -0.166 
  0.094  0.101 
Head of the household is 
foreigner (dummy) 
FO D     -0.445***  -0.230*** 
  0.077  0.083 
Head of the household has 
univ. entrance qualification 
UEQ D     0.171**  0.031 
  0.068  0.072 
Head of household has 
university degree (dummy) 
UD D     0.033  -0.016 
  0.072  0.076 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.062  -0.063 
  0.045  0.047 
Age of the head of the  
household  
Age    0.102  0.120 
  0.104  0.109 
Age of the head of the  
household, squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.006*  -0.006* 
  0.003  0.003 
Household from New 
Laender (dummy) 
NL D     0.533***  0.584*** 
  0.047  0.050 
Household has a savings 
book (dummy) 
BOOKS D       1.145*** 
    0.049 
Household has a building 
loan contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.361*** 
    0.049 
Household has a life 
insurance (dummy) 
LIVE D       0.118** 
    0.048 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.536*** 
    0.052 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.208 
    0.142 
Household has to repay 
building loans/mortgages 
1 REPAY D       -0.788*** 
    0.075 
Household has to repay 
credit loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.655*** 
    0.054 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.341*** 
    0.058 
Number of children in the 
household 
CHILDS N     -0.400***  -0.378*** 
  0.032  0.034 




  -0.548***  -0.629*** 
  0.054  0.058 
Number of observations  14,012  14,012  14,012 
Log Likelihood  -9,504.59  -7,906.60  -7,230.53 





2000/2004  2000/2005 









0.010  0.175  0.162  0.010  0.191  0.175 
Observation  point  after 
the reform (dummy) 
PR D   -0.016  -0.031
**  -0.031
**  -0.014  -0.022  -0.029
** 
0.015  0.015  0.014  0.015  0.016  0.014 
Belonging to treatment 
group 1 (dummy) 







0.013  0.033  0.031  0.013  0.034  0.030 
Interaction term 
1 T PR D D ×   0.007  0.004  0.003  0.001  -0.023  -0.015 
0.020  0.020  0.018  0.020  0.021  0.019 
Household income in 
thousand Euro  
1000 y     0.192
***  0.155
***    0.321
***  0.265
*** 
  0.059  0.054    0.064  0.057 
Household income in 
thousand Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.018  -0.012    -0.042
***  -0.033
*** 
  0.011  0.010    0.012  0.011 
Head of the household is 
unemployed (dummy) 
UN D     -0.080
***  -0.058
***    -0.061
***  -0.040
** 
  0.023  0.021    0.022  0.020 
Head of the household is 
self-employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.033
*  -0.026    -0.026  -0.027 
  0.020  0.019    0.023  0.022 
Head of the household is 
public servant (dummy) 
PS D     -0.014  -0.016    -0.010  -0.015 
  0.021  0.019    0.020  0.018 
Head of the household is 
pensioner (dummy) 
PE D     0.004  0.003    -0.029  -0.004 
  0.059  0.054    0.090  0.085 
Head of the household is 
white-collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.003  -0.007    0.011  0.001 
  0.013  0.012    0.013  0.012 
Head of the household is 
student (dummy) 
ST D     -0.152
**  -0.139
**    -0.092  -0.078 
  0.077  0.069    0.063  0.055 
Head of the household 
with other employment 
OE D     0.005  -0.001    0.011  0.009 
  0.020  0.018    0.020  0.018 
Head of the household is 
foreigner (dummy) 
FO D     -0.031
**  -0.020    -0.037
**  -0.016 
  0.015  0.014    0.015  0.014 
Head of the household has 
univ. entrance qualific. 
UEQ D     0.016  0.014    -0.005  -0.004 
  0.015  0.013    0.015  0.013 
Head of household has 
university degree 
UD D     0.005  0.004    0.020  0.019 
  0.015  0.014    0.015  0.014 
Head of household is 
female (dummy) 
FEM D     -0.040
***  -0.037
***    -0.037
***  -0.041
*** 
  0.013  0.012    0.013  0.012 
Age of the head of the  
household  
Age    0.012  0.008    0.014
*  0.009 
  0.008  0.007    0.008  0.008 
Age of the head of the  
household. squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.000
*  -0.000    -0.000
**  -0.000
* 
  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
Household from New 
Laender (dummy) 
NL D     0.013  0.013    0.014  0.007 
  0.013  0.011    0.014  0.012 
Household has a savings 
book (dummy) 
BOOKS D       0.044
***      0.065
*** 
    0.012      0.013 
Household has a building 
loan contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.011      0.019
* 
    0.009      0.010 
Household has a life 
insurance (dummy) 
LIVE D       0.002      -0.006 
    0.011      0.011 
Household owns 
securities (dummy) 
SEC D       0.044
***      0.047
*** 
    0.010      0.009 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.012      0.020 
    0.017      0.018 
Household has to repay 
building loans/mortgages 
1 REPAY D       -0.093
***      -0.095
*** 
    0.014      0.014 
Household has to repay 
credit loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.043
***      -0.031
*** 
    0.009      0.009 
Household owns real-
estate (dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.076
***      0.083
*** 
    0.014      0.014 
Number of observations  713  713  713  717  717  717 
Log Likelihood  96.16  151.25  217.49  72.50  131.29  206.76 
2 R Pseudo   -1.32  -2.64  -4.24  -3.31  -6.80  -11.29 
Remarks. Endogeneous: Saving ratio. 
***/
**/
* Significance on the 1/5/10-%-level. 






A  B  C 
Constant 
Const  0.097***  -0.492***  -0.345** 
0.010  0.160  0.142 
Observation  point  after 
the reform (dummy) 
PR D   -0.027*  -0.022  -0.031** 
0.014  0.015  0.013 
Belonging to treatment 
group 1 (dummy) 
1 T D   -0.107***  0.014  0.000 
0.013  0.026  0.023 
Interaction term 
1 T PR D D ×   0.002  -0.013  -0.003 
0.020  0.021  0.019 
Household income in 
thousand Euro  
1000 y     0.206***  0.171*** 
  0.056  0.051 
Household income in 
thousand Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.027***  -0.022** 
  0.010  0.009 
Head of the household is 
unemployed (dummy) 
UN D     -0.090***  -0.057*** 
  0.023  0.020 
Head of the household is 
self-employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.038*  -0.058*** 
  0.021  0.020 
Head of the household is 
public servant (dummy) 
PS D     -0.014  -0.019 
  0.021  0.018 
Head of the household is 
pensioner (dummy) 
PE D     -0.013  0.001 
  0.058  0.052 
Head of the household is 
white-collar (dummy) 
WC D     -0.001  -0.006 
  0.013  0.012 
Head of the household is 
student (dummy) 
ST D     -0.123  -0.117 
  0.084  0.071 
Head of the household 
with other employment 
OE D     0.001  -0.001 
  0.020  0.018 
Head of the household is 
foreigner (dummy) 
FO D     -0.021  -0.013 
  0.015  0.014 
Head of the household has 
univ. entrance qualific. 
UEQ D     -0.016  -0.015 
  0.016  0.014 
Head of household has 
university degree 
UD D     0.020  0.018 
  0.016  0.014 
Head of household is 
female (dummy) 
FEM D     -0.011  -0.018 
  0.014  0.012 
Age of the head of the  
household  
Age    0.012*  0.007 
  0.007  0.006 
Age of the head of the  
household. squared 
[ ]
2 Age     0.000**  0.000 
  0.000  0.000 
Household from New 
Laender (dummy) 
NL D     0.014  0.013 
  0.013  0.012 
Household has a savings 
book (dummy) 
BOOKS D       0.057*** 
    0.012 
Household has a building 
loan contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.016* 
    0.009 
Household has a life 
insurance (dummy) 
LIVE D       -0.001 
    0.011 
Household owns 
securities (dummy) 
SEC D       0.050*** 
    0.009 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       0.023 
    0.018 
Household has to repay 
building loans/mortgages 
1 REPAY D       -0.112*** 
    0.013 
Household has to repay 
credit loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.032*** 
    0.009 
Household owns real-
estate (dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.083*** 
    0.014 
Number of observations  743  743  743 
Log Likelihood  74.27  114.61  199.76 
2 R Pseudo   -3.03  -5.22  -9.84 
  




2000/2004  2000/2005 
A  B  C  A  B  C 
Constant 
Const  0.063





0.003  0.086  0.082  0.003  0.087  0.082 
Observation  point  after  the 
reform (dummy) 







0.005  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.004 
Belonging to treatment 
group 2 (dummy) 
2 T D   -0.040
***  -0.002  -0.001  -0.040
***  0.001  0.002 
0.004  0.006  0.006  0.004  0.006  0.006 
Interaction term 
2 T PR D D ×   -0.002  0.009  0.012
**  -0.002  0.010
*  0.009
* 
0.006  0.006  0.005  0.006  0.006  0.005 
Household income in 
thousand Euro  
1000 y     0.306
***  0.263
***    0.291
***  0.253
*** 
  0.014  0.014    0.014  0.013 
Household income in 
thousand Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.058
***  -0.051
***    -0.053
***  -0.047
*** 
  0.004  0.004    0.004  0.004 
Head of the household is 
unemployed (dummy) 
UN D     -0.068
***  -0.063
***    -0.066
***  -0.063
*** 
  0.007  0.007    0.007  0.007 
Head of the household is 
self-employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.013  -0.008    -0.023
***  -0.022
** 
  0.008  0.009    0.009  0.009 
Head of the household is 
public servant (dummy) 
PS D     -0.003  -0.010    -0.005  -0.010 
  0.010  0.009    0.010  0.009 
Head of the household is 
pensioner (dummy) 
PE D     0.006  -0.000    0.012
*  0.005 
  0.007  0.006    0.007  0.007 
Head of the household is 
white-collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.011
**  0.002    0.012
**  0.001 
  0.004  0.004    0.005  0.004 
Head of the household is 
student (dummy) 
ST D     -0.005  -0.023
**    0.009  -0.007 
  0.010  0.010    0.010  0.010 
Head of the household with 
other employment type 
OE D     -0.010  -0.013
*    -0.002  -0.006 
  0.007  0.007    0.007  0.007 
Head of the household is 
foreigner (dummy) 
FO D     -0.032
***  -0.008    -0.035
***  -0.011
** 
  0.006  0.006    0.006  0.006 
Head of the household has 
univ. entrance qualification 
UEQ D     0.009
*  0.001    0.010
**  0.002 
  0.005  0.004    0.005  0.004 
Head of household has 
university degree (dummy) 
UD D     0.003  0.002    0.002  -0.001 
  0.005  0.004    0.005  0.004 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.015
***  -0.013
***    -0.016
***  -0.014
*** 
  0.003  0.003    0.003  0.003 
Age of the head of the  
household  
Age    -0.002  0.003    0.004
***  0.008
*** 
  0.007  0.007    0.007  0.007 
Age of the head of the  
household. squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.000  -0.000    -0.000  -0.000
* 
  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
Household from New 
Laender (dummy) 
NL D     0.039
***  0.045
***    0.038
***  0.043
*** 
  0.003  0.003    0.003  0.003 
Household has a savings 
book (dummy) 
BOOKS D       0.074
***      0.073
*** 
    0.004      0.004 
Household has a building 
loan contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.023
***      0.020
*** 
    0.003      0.003 
Household has a life 
insurance (dummy) 
LIVE D       0.009
***      0.005
* 
    0.003      0.003 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.040
***      0.042
*** 
    0.003      0.003 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.001      0.008 
    0.009      0.009 
Household has to repay 
building loans/mortgages 
1 REPAY D       -0.060
***      -0.065
*** 
    0.005      0.005 
Household has to repay 
credit loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.063
***      -0.063
*** 
    0.004      0.004 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.045
***      0.047
*** 
    0.004      0.004 
Number of children in the 
household 
CHILDS N     -0.032
***  -0.028
***    -0.035
***  -0.031
*** 
  0.002  0.002    0.002  0.002 
Number of adults in the 
household 
ADULTS N     -0.054
***  -0.056
***    -0.055
***  -0.057
*** 
  0.004  0.004    0.004  0.004 
Number of observations  13.593  13.593  13.593  13.268  13.268  13.268 
Log Likelihood  -1,244.43  180.80  1,007.83  -1,152.48  297.85  1,101.16 
2 R Pseudo   0.08  1.13  1.74  0.07  1.24  1.88 
Remarks. Endogeneous: Saving ratio. 
***/
**/





A  B  C 
Constant 
Const  0.066***  -0.108  -0.187** 
0.003  0.087  0.082 
Observation  point  after  the 
reform (dummy) 
PR D   -0.023***  -0.047***  -0.046*** 
0.005  0.004  0.004 
Belonging to treatment 
group 2 (dummy) 
2 T D   -0.043***  -0.003  -0.001 
0.004  0.006  0.006 
Interaction term 
2 T PR D D ×   0.004  0.016***  0.015*** 
0.006  0.006  0.005 
Household income in 
thousand Euro  
1000 y     0.300***  0.258*** 
  0.014  0.013 
Household income in 
thousand Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.055***  -0.047*** 
  0.004  0.004 
Head of the household is 
unemployed (dummy) 
UN D     -0.076***  -0.071*** 
  0.007  0.006 
Head of the household is 
self-employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.024***  -0.022*** 
  0.008  0.008 
Head of the household is 
public servant (dummy) 
PS D     -0.006  -0.013 
  0.009  0.009 
Head of the household is 
pensioner (dummy) 
PE D     0.001  -0.004 
  0.007  0.006 
Head of the household is 
white-collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.008*  0.000 
  0.004  0.004 
Head of the household is 
student (dummy) 
ST D     -0.029**  -0.041*** 
  0.011  0.011 
Head of the household with 
other employment type 
OE D     -0.006  -0.007 
  0.007  0.007 
Head of the household is 
foreigner (dummy) 
FO D     -0.034***  -0.011* 
  0.006  0.006 
Head of the household has 
univ. entrance qualification 
UEQ D     0.012***  0.002 
  0.005  0.004 
Head of household has 
university degree (dummy) 
UD D     0.007  0.004 
  0.005  0.004 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.012***  -0.010*** 
  0.003  0.003 
Age of the head of the  
household  
Age    0.000  0.005 
  0.007  0.007 
Age of the head of the  
household. squared 
[ ]
2 Age     0.000  0.000 
  0.000  0.000 
Household from New 
Laender (dummy) 
NL D     0.040***  0.046*** 
  0.003  0.003 
Household has a savings 
book (dummy) 
BOOKS D       0.071*** 
    0.003 
Household has a building 
loan contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.020*** 
    0.003 
Household has a life 
insurance (dummy) 
LIVE D       0.006* 
    0.003 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.042*** 
    0.003 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       0.006 
    0.009 
Household has to repay 
building loans/mortgages 
1 REPAY D       -0.071*** 
    0.005 
Household has to repay 
credit loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.057*** 
    0.004 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.050*** 
    0.003 
Number of children in the 
household 
CHILDS N     -0.034***  -0.031*** 
  0.002  0.002 
Number of adults in the 
household 
ADULTS N     -0.055***  -0.058*** 
  0.004  0.004 
Number of observations  14,012  14,012  14,012 
Log Likelihood  -1,290.17  325.50  1,165.14 
2 R Pseudo   0.08  1.23  1.83 
 Annex 
 
Table A1. Composition of the treatment and the control group – main approach 











Observations  273  165  182  188 
Savings: yes  0.447  0.455  0.401  0.410 
Saving amount  81  72  81  81 
Income  1.629  1.815  1.862  1.858 
Head of the household: unemployed  0.136  0.170  0.181  0.191 
Head of the household: self-employed  0.048  0.073  0.049  0.080 
Head of the household: public servant  0.007  0.006  0.011  0.011 
Head of the household: pensioner  0.004  0  0  0.005 
Head of the household: white-collar  0.179  0.176  0.198  0.213 
Head of the household: blue-collar  0.454  0.442  0.423  0.367 
Head of the household: student  0.007  0.006  0.016  0.011 
Head of the household: other employment type  0.176  0.145  0.137  0.149 
Head of the household: foreigner  0.249  0.200  0.198  0.154 
Head  of  the  household  with  univ.  entrance 
qualification  0.062  0.103  0.115  0.122 
Head of the household with university degree  0.077  0.079  0.066  0.085 
Head of the household: female  0.300  0.388  0.407  0.372 
Age of the head of the household  35.9  36.2  36.6  37.1 
Household from New Laender  0.216  0.218  0.198  0.207 
Household has a savings book  0.725  0.709  0.676  0.697 
Household has a building loan contract   0.487  0.515  0.555  0.548 
Household has a life insurance  0.604  0.606  0.582  0.617 
Household has securities  0.172  0.248  0.280  0.271 
Household owns business property  0.059  0.067  0.044  0.043 
Repayments for building loans/mortgages  0.271  0.279  0.286  0.319 
Repayments for credit loans  0.363  0.388  0.346  0.330 
Household owns real-estate  0.385  0.400  0.401  0.447 
Observations in millions (weighted)   0.47  0.38  0.45  0.47 
 
 
 Continuation of Table A1 





U   
[2004] 
V   
[2005] 
W   
[2006] 
Observations  148  127  114  136 
Savings: yes  0.831  0.811  0.825  0.794 
Saving amount  357  334  333  327 
Income  3.217  3.449  3.462  3.597 
Head of the household: unemployed  0.007  0.008  0.009  0.015 
Head of the household: self-employed  0.122  0.110  0.026  0.059 
Head of the household: public servant  0.182  0.134  0.167  0.162 
Head of the household: pensioner  0.007  0.016  0  0.022 
Head of the household: white-collar  0.500  0.559  0.561  0.544 
Head of the household: blue-collar  0.142  0.134  0.175  0.132 
Head of the household: student  0.007  0.008  0  0 
Head  of  the  household:  other  employment 
type 
0.047  0.055  0.061  0.066 
Head of the household: foreigner  0.041  0.047  0.044  0.059 
Head  of  the  household  with  univ.  entrance 
qualification 
0.493  0.457  0.456  0.515 
Head of the household with university degree  0.405  0.354  0.342  0.419 
Head of the household: female  0.216  0.283  0.263  0.272 
Age of the head of the household  39.4  39.5  40.2  40.9 
Household from New Laender  0.128  0.134  0.053  0.110 
Household has a savings book  0.899  0.827  0.904  0.875 
Household has a building loan contract   0.682  0.661  0.737  0.684 
Household has a life insurance  0.878  0.858  0.895  0.904 
Household has securities  0.534  0.638  0.596  0.669 
Household owns business property  0.101  0.094  0.044  0.059 
Repayments for building loans/mortgages  0.655  0.685  0.693  0.669 
Repayments for credit loans  0.372  0.378  0.219  0.235 
Household owns real-estate  0.757  0.787  0.798  0.809 
Number  of  observations  in  millions 
(weighted)  
0.30  0.34  0.35  0.32 
 
Remarks. All values are unweighted (exception: last row).  
 Table A2. Composition of the treatment and the control group – audit approach 











Observations  4.723  3.474  3.268  3.713 
Savings: yes  0.577  0.516  0.536  0.515 
Saving amount  133  119  129  128 
Income  1.650  1.689  1.671  1.710 
Household size  2.29  2.16  2.05  2.08 
Number of children  0.668  0.583  0.526  0.540 
Head of the household: unemployed  0.126  0.166  0.176  0.182 
Head of the household: self-employed  0.038  0.032  0.032  0.040 
Head of the household: public servant  0.035  0.035  0.040  0.037 
Head of the household: pensioner  0.077  0.091  0.092  0.089 
Head of the household: white-collar  0.355  0.372  0.371  0.377 
Head of the household: blue-collar  0.340  0.291  0.278  0.275 
Head of the household: student  0.022  0.024  0.024  0.023 
Head  of  the  household:  other 
employment type  0.073  0.072  0.069  0.066 
Head of the household: foreigner  0.109  0.083  0.078  0.072 
Head  of  the  household  with  univ. 
entrance qualification  0.189  0.210  0.216  0.228 
Head of the household with university 
degree  0.149  0.161  0.165  0.161 
Head of the household: female  0.375  0.431  0.440  0.433 
Age of the head of the household  40.4  41.5  41.3  41.8 
Household from New Laender  0.249  0.271  0.278  0.267 
Household has a savings book  0.735  0.668  0.667  0.656 
Household  has  a  building  loan 
contract   0.436  0.427  0.435  0.434 
Household has a life insurance  0.584  0.533  0.526  0.535 
Household has securities  0.247  0.309  0.290  0.289 
Household owns business property  0.033  0.022  0.021  0.022 
Repayments  for  building 
loans/mortgages  0.191  0.178  0.172  0.181 
Repayments for credit loans  0.322  0.314  0.238  0.235 
Household owns real-estate  0.300  0.288  0.282  0.301 
Share of household members eligible 
for the Riester scheme   1  1  1  1 
Number  of  observations  in  millions  
(weighted)  
12.93  12.25  11.94  12.25 
 Continuation: Table A2 











Observations  2.859  2.537  2.418  2.854 
Savings: yes  0.625  0.594  0.614  0.588 
Saving amount  159  149  158  154 
Income  1.339  1.453  1.458  1.504 
Household size  1.54  1.52  1.50  1.56 
Number of children  0.057  0.040  0.035  0.056 
Head of the household: unemployed  0  0  0  0 
Head of the household: self-employed  0.030  0.025  0.023  0.026 
Head of the household: public servant  0  0  0  0 
Head of the household: pensioner  0.881  0.913  0.919  0.916 
Head of the household: white-collar  0  0  0  0 
Head of the household: blue-collar  0  0  0  0 
Head of the household: student  0.038  0.038  0.039  0.030 
Head of the household: other employment 
type  0.058  0.037  0.030  0.040 
Head of the household: foreigner  0.051  0.040  0.040  0.037 
Head of the household with univ. entrance 
qualification  0.126  0.134  0.133  0.137 
Head  of  the  household  with  university 
degree  0.111  0.138  0.137  0.130 
Head of the household: female  0.474  0.478  0.489  0.467 
Age of the head of the household  66.9  68.5  68.9  68.8 
Household from New Laender  0.276  0.301  0.297  0.289 
Household has a savings book  0.807  0.778  0.768  0.748 
Household has a building loan contract   0.155  0.203  0.211  0.226 
Household has a life insurance  0.249  0.219  0.224  0.222 
Household has securities  0.198  0.270  0.261  0.282 
Household owns business property  0.021  0.013  0.012  0.019 
Repayments for building loans/mortgages  0.066  0.068  0.066  0.078 
Repayments for credit loans  0.077  0.073  0.050  0.050 
Household owns real-estate  0.417  0.434  0.432  0.454 
Share  of  household  members  eligible  for 
the Riester scheme   0  0  0  0 
Number  of  observations  in  millions  
(weighted)   10.34  10.20  9.80  9.99 
 
Remarks. All values are unweighted (exception: last row). 
  
Table A3a. Probability to save – Logit-estimation. main approach (without unemployed and 
East German observations) 
  
   
 
2000/2004  2000/2005 









0.226  3.362  3.737  0.226  3.696  4.208 
Observation point after the reform 
(dummy) 
PR D   0.004  -0.406  -0.388  0.004  -0.162  -0.147 
0.336  0.400  0.431  0.336  0.395  0.433 
Belonging to treatment group 1 
(dummy) 







0.270  0.775  0.839  0.270  0.774  0.821 
Interaction term 
1 T PR D D ×   -0.065  -0.146  -0.110  -0.320  -0.937
*  -0.783 
0.411  0.482  0.518  0.411  0.492  0.538 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     3.436
***  3.226
**    5.130
***  4.669
*** 
  1.332  1.473    1.418  1.540 
Household income in thousand 
Euro. Squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.274  -0.244    -0.684
**  -0.627
** 
  0.278  0.301    0.284  0.305 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.723
*  -0.431    -0.127  -0.097 
  0.411  0.471    0.451  0.518 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     0.720  0.356    1.084
*  0.988 
  0.597  0.620    0.585  0.630 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
AN D     0.079  -0.211    0.363  0.230 
  0.280  0.311    0.275  0.305 
Head of the household has other 
employment type (dummy) 
OE D     -0.416  -0.462    -0.178  -0.025 
  0.398  0.441    0.400  0.441 
Head of the household is foreigner 
(dummy) 
FO D     -0.637
**  -0.544
*    -0.631
**  -0.372 
  0.270  0.310    0.272  0.319 
Head of the household has univ. 
entrance qualification 
UEQ D     0.203  0.188    -0.357  -0.271 
  0.348  0.368    0.343  0.366 
Head of household has university 
degree (dummy) (Dummy) 
UD D     0.142  0.239    0.660
*  0.744
* 
  0.376  0.403    0.382  0.411 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.411  -0.551
*    -0.393  -0.764
** 
  0.286  0.313    0.287  0.316 
Age of the head of the  household  
Age    0.237
*  0.257    0.365
**  0.437
** 
  0.141  0.161    0.156  0.182 
Age of the head of the  household. 
Squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.003
*  -0.004
*    -0.005
***  -0.007
*** 
  0.002  0.002    0.002  0.002 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       1.404
***      1.795
*** 
    0.304      0.321 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.074      0.290 
    0.250      0.258 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       -0.169      -0.343 
    0.292      0.304 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.846
***      0.803
*** 
    0.275      0.274 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.892
*      -0.096 
    0.463      0.516 
Household has to repay building 
loans/mortgages obilien (Dummy) 
1 REPAY D       -1.866
***      -1.646
*** 
    0.483      0.460 
Household has to repay credit 
loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.226      0.173 
    0.237      0.251 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       1.632
***      1.511
*** 
    0.476      0.456 
Number of observations  534  534  534  537  537  537 
Log Likelihood  -320.52  -286.33  -252.30  -321.51  -284.97  -246.28 
2 R Pseudo   0.08  0.18  0.28  0.09  0.20  0.31 
Remarks. Endogeneous: Saving decision (dummy : 1=yes; 0=no). 
***/
**/
* Significance on the 1/5/10-%-level. Pensioners and 
studentes were excluded due to a low number of observations. 
 Table A3b. Probability to save – Logit-estimation. main approach (without unemployed and 
East German observations) 
  
   
 
2000/2006 
A  B  C 
Constant 
Const  1.457***  -11.895***  -12.216*** 
0.227  3.348  3.734 
Observation point after the reform 
(dummy) 
PR D   -0.190  -0.086  -0.228 
0.305  0.336  0.369 
Belonging to treatment group 1 
(dummy) 
1 T D   -1.402***  0.778  0.426 
0.271  0.536  0.581 
Interaction term 
1 T PR D D ×   -0.140  -0.730  -0.557 
0.397  0.464  0.507 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     3.514***  3.185** 
  1.211  1.329 
Household income in thousand 
Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.435**  -0.385 
  0.220  0.239 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.360  -0.779 
  0.424  0.522 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     0.775  0.490 
  0.551  0.587 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
AN D     0.068  -0.060 
  0.270  0.300 
Head of the household has other 
employment type (dummy) 
OE D     -0.048  0.192 
  0.387  0.429 
Head of the household is foreigner 
(dummy) 
FO D     -0.316  -0.282 
  0.264  0.306 
Head of the household has univ. 
entrance qualification 
UEQ D     -0.386  -0.469 
  0.361  0.386 
Head of household has university 
degree (dummy) (Dummy) 
UD D     0.266  0.564 
  0.392  0.423 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.451  -0.894*** 
  0.293  0.326 
Age of the head of the  household  
Age    0.384***  0.397** 
  0.146  0.166 
Age of the head of the  household. 
squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.005***  -0.006*** 
  0.002  0.002 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       1.722*** 
    0.306 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.112 
    0.238 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       -0.273 
    0.285 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.701*** 
    0.260 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.054 
    0.533 
Household has to repay building 
loans/mortgages (dummy) 
1 REPAY D       -2.176*** 
    0.466 
Household has to repay credit 
loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       0.221 
    0.249 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       1.825*** 
    0.463 
Number of observations  546  546  546 
Log Likelihood  -327.56  -301.29  -260.06 
2 R Pseudo   0.08  0.16  0.27 Table A4a. Saving ratios – tobit estimation. main approach (without unemployed and East 
German observations) 
  
   
 
2000/2004  2000/2005 









0.010  0.186  0.173  0.010  0.207  0.188 
Observation point after the reform 
(dummy) 
PR D   -0.009  -0.025  -0.023  -0.011  -0.019  -0.021 
0.015  0.016  0.015  0.016  0.017  0.015 
Belonging to treatment group 1 
(dummy) 







0.014  0.037  0.033  0.014  0.037  0.033 
Interaction term 
1 T PR D D ×   0.002  -0.004  -0.001  -0.002  -0.035  -0.017 
0.021  0.022  0.020  0.022  0.023  0.021 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     0.198
***  0.147
**    0.322
***  0.243
*** 
  0.066  0.061    0.073  0.065 
Household income in thousand 
Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.020  -0.012    -0.044
***  -0.032
*** 
  0.012  0.011    0.013  0.012 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.043
*  -0.031    -0.023  -0.027 
  0.022  0.021    0.024  0.023 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     -0.010  -0.018    -0.005  -0.014 
  0.022  0.020    0.021  0.019 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
AN D     -0.000  -0.013    0.012  0.003 
  0.014  0.013    0.014  0.013 
Head of the household has other 
employment type (dummy) 
OE D     -0.000  -0.004    -0.001  0.006 
  0.022  0.020    0.022  0.020 
Head of the household is foreigner 
(dummy) 
FO D     -0.034
**  -0.028
*    -0.039
**  -0.022 
  0.015  0.014    0.016  0.015 
Head of the household has univ. 
entrance qualification (dummy) 
UEQ D     0.013  0.015    -0.009  -0.003 
  0.016  0.015    0.017  0.015 
Head of household has university 
degree (dummy) (Dummy) 
UD D     0.018  0.010    0.038
**  0.032
** 
  0.017  0.015    0.017  0.016 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.039
***  -0.038
***    -0.026
*  -0.036
*** 
  0.015  0.013    0.015  0.014 
Age of the head of the  household  
Age    0.013
*  0.012    0.016
*  0.015
* 
  0.008  0.007    0.009  0.008 
Age of the head of the  household. 
squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.000
*  -0.000
**    -0.000
**  -0.000
** 
  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       0.062
***      0.080
*** 
    0.014      0.015 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.006      0.014 
    0.010      0.011 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       -0.009      -0.020 
    0.013      0.013 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.038
***      0.042
*** 
    0.011      0.010 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.010      0.034
* 
    0.019      0.020 
Household has to repay building 
loans/mortgages obilien (Dummy) 
1 REPAY D       -0.103
***      -0.098
*** 
    0.015      0.015 
Household has to repay credit 
loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.033
***      -0.017 
    0.010      0.010 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.083
***      0.087
*** 
    0.015      0.015 
Number of observations  534  534  534  537  537  537 
Log Likelihood  111.12  143.62  199.76  95.88  130.96  195.70 
2 R Pseudo   -0.46  -0.89  -1.62  -0.59  -1.17  -2.25 
Remarks. Endogeneous: Saving ratio. 
***/
**/
* Significance on the 1/5/10-%-Niveau. Pensioners and students were excluded 
due to a low number of observations. 
 Table A4b. Saving ratios – tobit estimation. main approach (without unemployed and East 
German observations) 
  
   
 
2000/2006 
A  B  C 
Constant 
Const  0.094***  -0.644***  -0.524*** 
0.011  0.191  0.169 
Observation point after the reform 
(dummy) 
PR D   -0.021  -0.020  -0.027** 
0.015  0.015  0.013 
Belonging to treatment group 1 
(dummy) 
1 T D   -0.090***  0.029  0.006 
0.014  0.028  0.025 
Interaction term 
1 T PR D D ×   0.007  -0.017  -0.003 
0.022  0.024  0.020 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     0.197***  0.156*** 
  0.064  0.058 
Household income in thousand 
Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.025**  -0.020* 
  0.011  0.010 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.033  -0.060*** 
  0.023  0.022 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     -0.005  -0.016 
  0.022  0.018 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
AN D     0.001  -0.004 
  0.015  0.013 
Head of the household has other 
employment type (dummy) 
OE D     -0.009  0.002 
  0.022  0.019 
Head of the household is foreigner 
(dummy) 
FO D     -0.019  -0.016 
  0.015  0.014 
Head of the household has univ. 
entrance qualification (dummy) 
UEQ D     -0.020  -0.016 
  0.018  0.015 
Head of household has university 
degree (dummy) (Dummy) 
UD D     0.025  0.022 
  0.019  0.016 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.008  -0.026* 
  0.016  0.014 
Age of the head of the  household  
Age    0.020**  0.017** 
  0.008  0.008 
Age of the head of the  household. 
squared 
[ ]
2 Age     0.000**  0.000*** 
  0.000  0.000 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       0.078*** 
    0.014 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.007 
    0.010 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       -0.015 
    0.012 
Household owns securities 
(dummy) 
SEC D       0.043*** 
    0.010 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       0.032 
    0.020 
Household has to repay building 
loans/mortgages obilien (Dummy) 
1 REPAY D       -0.124*** 
    0.014 
Household has to repay credit 
loans (dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.016 
    0.010 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.100*** 
    0.015 
Number of observations  546  546  546 
Log Likelihood  102.86  123.87  203.61 
2 R Pseudo   -0.44  -0.74  -1.85 Table A5a. Probability to save – logit estimation. audit approach (without unemployed) 
  
   
 
2000/2004  2000/2005 









0.039  1.231  1.292  0.039  1.260  1.320 
Observation point after the reform 
(dummy) 
PR D   -0.130
**  -0.414
***  -0.429
***  -0.048  -0.349
***  -0.346
*** 
0.056  0.063  0.066  0.057  0.064  0.067 
Belonging to treatment group 2 
(dummy) 
2 T D   -0.013  -0.035  -0.025  -0.013  0.086  0.114 
0.050  0.089  0.094  0.050  0.091  0.096 
Interaction term 
2 T PR D D ×   -0.052  0.037  0.072  -0.007  0.072  0.054 
0.075  0.082  0.087  0.076  0.084  0.089 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     3.602
***  3.443
***    3.667
***  3.574
*** 
  0.211  0.223    0.210  0.220 
Household income in thousand 
Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.640
***  -0.620
***    -0.646
***  -0.639
*** 
  0.063  0.066    0.062  0.065 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.534
***  -0.402
***    -0.560
***  -0.472
*** 
  0.114  0.131    0.117  0.135 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     0.081  -0.020    0.162  0.071 
  0.150  0.157    0.152  0.160 
Head of the household is pensioner  
(dummy) 
PE D     0.010  -0.085    0.113  0.024 
  0.099  0.106    0.103  0.109 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.234
***  0.128
*    0.267
***  0.143
** 
  0.063  0.076    0.065  0.069 
Head of the household is student 
(dummy) 
ST D     -0.265  -0.509
***    0.138  -0.063 
  0.144  0.151    0.145  0.151 
Head of the household has other 
employment type (dummy) 
OE D     -0.206
**  -0.241
**    -0.033  -0.066 
  0.095  0.102    0.098  0.105 
Head of household is foreigner 
(dummy) 
FO D     -0.484
***  -0.263
***    -0.474
***  -0.252
*** 
  0.078  0.085    0.080  0.086 
Head of the household has univ. 
entrance qualification (dummy) 
UEQ D     0.102  -0.008    0.052  -0.059 
  0.070  0.074    0.071  0.075 
Head of household has university 
degree (dummy)  
UD D     0.022  -0.001    0.009  -0.030 
  0.071  0.075    0.072  0.076 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.125
***  -0.121
**    -0.153
***  -0.147
*** 
  0.047  0.050    0.048  0.050 
Age of the head of the household 
Age    0.190
*  0.213
*    0.273
**  0.292
*** 
  0.104  0.109    0.107  0.112 
Age of the head of the household. 
squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.008
***  -0.008
**    -0.011
***  -0.011
*** 
  0.003  0.003    0.003  0.003 
Household from New Laender 
(dummy) 
NL D     0.448
***  0.515
***    0.442
***  0.492
*** 
  0.049  0.052    0.050  0.053 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       1.156
***      1.141
*** 
    0.051      0.052 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.385
***      0.278
*** 
    0.051      0.053 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       0.118
**      0.077 
    0.050      0.051 
Household owns securities (dummy) 
SEC D       0.502
***      0.535
*** 
    0.054      0.056 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.225      -0.131 
    0.146      0.153 
Household has to repay building 
loans/mortgages obilien (Dummy) 
1 REPAY D       -0.574
***      -0.693
*** 
    0.080      0.081 
Household has to repay credit loans 
(dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.773
***      -0.727
*** 
    0.055      0.057 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.254
***      0.294
*** 
    0.060      0.062 
Number of children in the 
household 
CHILDS N     -0.357
***  -0.340
***    -0.385
***  -0.377
*** 
  0.033  0.036    0.034  0.037 
Number of adults in the household 
ADULTS N     -0.500
***  -0.568
***    -0.507
***  -0.561
*** 
  0.057  0.061    0.057  0.062 
Number of observations  12,424  12,424  12,424  12,100  12,100  12,100 
Log Likelihood  -8,314.08  -7,305.44  -6,677.47  -8,042.47  -7,023.60  -6,441.17 
2 R Pseudo   0.00  0.12  0.20  0.00  0.13  0.20 
Remarks. Endogeneous: Saving decision (dummy: 1=yes ; 0=no). 
***/
**/
* Significance on the 1/5/10-%-level.  
 Table A5b. Probability to save – logit estimation. audit approach (without unemployed) 
  
   
 
2000/2006 
A  B  C 
Constant 
Const  0.557***  -3.366***  -4.233*** 
0.039  1.265  1.332 
Observation point after the reform 
(dummy) 
PR D   -0.202***  -0.552***  -0.548*** 
0.055  0.062  0.066 
Belonging to treatment group 2 
(dummy) 
2 T D   -0.048  -0.014  0.020 
0.051  0.090  0.095 
Interaction term 
2 T PR D D ×   0.076  0.166**  0.156* 
0.074  0.082  0.087 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     3.865***  3.676*** 
  0.203  0.213 
Household income in thousand 
Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.691***  -0.656*** 
  0.058  0.062 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.569***  -0.478*** 
  0.111  0.127 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     0.166  0.057 
  0.152  0.160 
Head of the household is pensioner  
(dummy) 
PE D     -0.076  -0.181* 
  0.101  0.107 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.177***  0.065 
  0.063  0.067 
Head of the household is student 
(dummy) 
ST D     -0.414***  -0.608*** 
  0.154  0.160 
Head of the household has other 
employment type (dummy) 
OE D     -0.170*  -0.173* 
  0.095  0.102 
Head of household is foreigner 
(dummy) 
FO D     -0.452***  -0.239*** 
  0.080  0.086 
Head of the household has univ. 
entrance qualification (dummy) 
UEQ D     0.155**  0.022 
  0.070  0.074 
Head of household has university 
degree (dummy)  
UD D     0.023  -0.024 
  0.074  0.079 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.100**  -0.103** 
  0.047  0.049 
Age of the head of the household 
Age    0.143  0.158 
  0.107  0.113 
Age of the head of the household. 
squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.007**  -0.007** 
  0.003  0.003 
Household from New Laender 
(dummy) 
NL D     0.510***  0.573*** 
  0.049  0.052 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       1.151*** 
    0.050 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.340*** 
    0.051 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       0.123** 
    0.049 
Household owns securities (dummy) 
SEC D       0.539*** 
    0.054 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.198 
    0.144 
Household has to repay building 
loans/mortgages obilien (Dummy) 
1 REPAY D       -0.780*** 
    0.077 
Household has to repay credit loans 
(dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.633*** 
    0.056 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.335*** 
    0.060 
Number of children in the 
household 
CHILDS N     -0.380***  -0.367*** 
  0.033  0.036 
Number of adults in the household 
ADULTS N     -0.541***  -0.615*** 
  0.056  0.060 
Number of observations  12,571  12,571  12,751 
Log Likelihood  -8,507.74  -7,395.13  -6,769.00 
2 R Pseudo   0.00  0.13  0.21 Table A6a. Saving ratios– tobit estimations. audit approach (without unemployed) 
  
   
2000/2004  2000/2005 









0.004  0.089  0.084  0.003  0.090  0.085 
Observation point after the reform 
(dummy) 







0.005  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.004 
Belonging to treatment group 2 
(dummy) 
2 T D   -0.027
***  -0.004  -0.002  -0.027
***  0.000  0.002 
0.004  0.006  0.006  0.004  0.006  0.006 
Interaction term 
2 T PR D D ×   0.003  0.009  0.012
**  0.007  0.011
*  0.009
* 
0.006  0.006  0.005  0.006  0.006  0.006 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     0.288
***  0.249
***    0.285
***  0.251
*** 
  0.015  0.014    0.015  0.014 
Household income in thousand 
Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.054
***  -0.047
***    -0.052
***  -0.047
*** 
  0.004  0.004    0.004  0.004 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.013  -0.008    -0.021
**  -0.019 
  0.008  0.009    0.009  0.009 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     -0.002  -0.010    -0.003  -0.009 
  0.010  0.009    0.010  0.009 
Head of the household is pensioner  
(dummy) 
PE D     0.005  -0.002    0.015
**  0.007 
  0.007  0.007    0.007  0.007 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.011
**  0.002    0.013
***  0.002 
  0.005  0.004    0.005  0.004 
Head of the household is student 
(dummy) 
ST D     -0.010  -0.028
***    0.009  -0.006 
  0.011  0.010    0.010  0.010 
Head of the household has other 
employment type (dummy) 
OE D     -0.010  -0.013
*    -0.000  -0.003 
  0.007  0.007    0.007  0.007 
Head of household is foreigner 
(dummy) 
FO D     -0.034
***  -0.010
*    -0.037
***  -0.012
** 
  0.006  0.006    0.006  0.006 
Head of the household has univ. 
entrance qualification (dummy) 
UEQ D     0.009
*  0.001    0.008
*  0.001 
  0.005  0.004    0.006  0.005 
Head of household has university 
degree (dummy)  
UD D     0.004  0.002    0.002  -0.001 
  0.005  0.004    0.005  0.005 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.018
***  -0.015
***    -0.019
***  -0.016
*** 
  0.003  0.003    0.003  0.003 
Age of the head of the household 
Age    0.002  0.006    0.008  0.012
* 
  0.007  0.007    0.000  0.007 
Age of the head of the household. 
squared 
[ ]
2 Age     -0.000  -0.000    -0.000
*  -0.000
** 
  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
Household from New Laender 
(dummy) 
NL D     0.039
***  0.046
***    0.037
***  0.044
*** 
  0.003  0.003    0.003  0.003 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       0.074
***      0.071
*** 
    0.004      0.004 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.023
***      0.020
*** 
    0.003      0.003 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       0.009
***      0.005 
    0.003      0.00 
Household owns securities (dummy) 
SEC D       0.040
***      0.042
*** 
    0.003      0.003 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       -0.002      0.004 
    0.009      0.010 
Household has to repay building 
loans/mortgages (dummy) 
1 REPAY D       -0.060
***      -0.064
*** 
    0.005      0.005 
Household has to repay credit loans 
(dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.063
***      -0.064
*** 
    0.004      0.005 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.046
***      0.047
*** 
    0.004      0.004 
Number of children in the 
household 
CHILDS N     -0.031
***  -0.028
***    -0.033
***  -0.030
*** 
  0.002  0.002    0.003  0.002 
Number of adults in the household 
ADULTS N     -0.054
***  -0.056
***    -0.056
***  -0.057
*** 
  0.004  0.004    0.004  0.004 
Number of observations  12,424  12,424  12,424  12,100  12,100  12,100 
Log Likelihood  -671.49  390.85  1,166.26  -537.43  535.12  1,285.39 
2 R Pseudo   0.07  1.54  2.62  0.06  1.94  3.26 
Remarks. Endogeneous: Saving ratio. 
***/
**/
* Significance on the 1/5/10-%-level.  
 Table A6b. Saving ratios– tobit estimations. audit approach (without unemployed) 
  
   
2000/2006 
A  B  C 
Constant 
Const  0.068***  -0.145  -0.218** 
0.003  0.089  0.084 
Observation point after the reform 
(dummy) 
PR D   -0.023***  -0.046***  -0.045*** 
0.004  0.004  0.004 
Belonging to treatment group 2 
(dummy) 
2 T D   -0.030***  -0.007  -0.004 
0.004  0.006  0.006 
Interaction term 
2 T PR D D ×   0.015**  0.018***  0.017*** 
0.006  0.006  0.005 
Household income in thousand 
Euro  
1000 y     0.289***  0.249*** 
  0.014  0.013 
Household income in thousand 
Euro. squared 
[ ]
2 1000 y     -0.052***  -0.045*** 
  0.004  0.004 
Head of the household is self-
employed  (dummy) 
SE D     -0.024***  -0.022*** 
  0.008  0.008 
Head of the household is public 
servant (dummy) 
PS D     -0.004  -0.011 
  0.009  0.009 
Head of the household is pensioner  
(dummy) 
PE D     0.000  -0.007*** 
  0.007  0.007 
Head of the household is white-
collar (dummy) 
WC D     0.009**  0.001 
  0.004  0.004 
Head of the household is student 
(dummy) 
ST D     -0.030***  -0.041*** 
  0.011  0.011 
Head of the household has other 
employment type (dummy) 
OE D     -0.006  -0.007 
  0.007  0.007 
Head of household is foreigner 
(dummy) 
FO D     -0.034***  -0.011* 
  0.006  0.006 
Head of the household has univ. 
entrance qualification (dummy) 
UEQ D     0.011**  0.001 
  0.005  0.004 
Head of household has university 
degree (dummy)  
UD D     0.007  0.004 
  0.005  0.005 
Head of household is female 
(dummy) 
FEM D     -0.016***  -0.013*** 
  0.003  0.003 
Age of the head of the household 
Age    0.004  0.008 
  0.008  0.007 
Age of the head of the household. 
squared 
[ ]
2 Age     0.000  0.000* 
  0.000  0.000 
Household from New Laender 
(dummy) 
NL D     0.040***  0.046*** 
  0.003  0.003 
Household has a savings book 
(dummy) 
BOOKS D       0.070*** 
    0.003 
Household has a building loan 
contract (dummy) 
LOAN D       0.018*** 
    0.003 
Household has a life insurance 
(dummy) 
LIVE D       0.006* 
    0.003 
Household owns securities (dummy) 
SEC D       0.042*** 
    0.003 
Household owns business 
property/shares (dummy) 
BPS D       0.006 
    0.009 
Household has to repay building 
loans/mortgages (dummy) 
1 REPAY D       -0.070*** 
    0.005 
Household has to repay credit loans 
(dummy) 
2 REPAY D       -0.055*** 
    0.004 
Household owns real-estate 
(dummy) 
ESTATE D       0.050*** 
    0.003 
Number of children in the 
household 
CHILDS N     -0.033***  -0.030*** 
  0.002  0.002 
Number of adults in the household 
ADULTS N     -0.055***  -0.057*** 
  0.004  0.004 
Number of observations  12,751  12,751  12,751 
Log Likelihood  -614.03  561.83  1,346.62 
2 R Pseudo   0.06  1.86  3.05 
 
 
 